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Europeanization of Civil Society in Turkey: Legacy of 
the #Occupygezi Movement 
 
Abstract 
The Occupygezi movement has revealed that a more comprehensive approach needs to be taken in order to understand 
the deep socio-political drives underpinning the Turkish bid for EU membership. Focusing on three different framings, 
namely Euro-enthusiastic, Euro-skeptic and critical Europeanist frames, developed by the civil society organizations in 
Turkey since the 1999 Helsinki Summit of the European Union, this article will show the transformative effect of the 
Occupygezi movement on the mindsets of secular groups, who were previously Euro-skeptic. Subsequently, the article 
will claim that the last frame is recently becoming stronger along with the authoritarianization of the Turkish state. 
Methodologically, the paper will be based on the literature survey of civil society actors, and discourse analysis of the 
civil society actors (associations, trade unions, and the media) in relation to their changing perception of the EU before 
and after the Occupygezi movement. 
Keywords: Occupygezi, Europeanization, Euroskepticism, critical Europeanism, civil society, Turkey 
 
Introduction 
 
The aim of this article is to examine the relationship between the European Union and Turkey from 
the specific angle of the process of Europeanization, a process which facilitated the mobilization of 
Turkish civil society actors during and after the #Occupygezi movement in the summer of 2013. 
The author assumes that a more comprehensive approach needs to be taken in order to understand 
the deep socio-political drives underpinning the Turkish bid for EU membership as economic or 
geopolitical arguments do not exhaust the debate on Turkey’s EU accession. From this perspective, 
understanding the broader process of Europeanization in political and social terms is crucial in order 
to capture the real drives of the European integration process in its entirety.  
This article focuses specifically on three different framings developed by the civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in Turkey with respect to the European integration process, which is believed 
to have deepened since the 1999 Helsinki Summit of the European Union. These three main frames 
are Euro-enthusiastic, Euro-skeptic and critical Europeanist attitudes generated by different civil 
society actors as a response to the changing political, social, economic and cultural climate between 
Turkey and the European Union as well as within Turkey itself. Theoretically speaking, the Euro-
enthusiastic frame proposes a positive assessment of European development and detects some 
problems in the implementation of the project, which are believed to be resulting from the EU 
institutions. The Euro-skeptic frame tends to read the regional integration process as a set of 
detrimental dynamics that threatens the communitarian bases necessary for the sustainability of the 
local and national political projects. This frame is a more local and nationalist interpretation of 
European integration, which is perceived as a direct intervention in the sovereignty of the nation-
states. The critical Europeanist frame searches for a more social and democratic Europe rather than 
a market-based Europe. As will be further delineated, this last frame was developed during and after 
the Gezi movement, which spilled over to the entire country in June 2013 as a popular form of 
resistance against the authoritarian rule of the Justice and Development Party, which has governed 
the country since 2002. It will be argued that it was this last form of framing that has made at least 
some Turkish civil society actors embrace the European integration process as an anchor for the 
democratization of the country.1 Focusing on three different framings developed by civil society 
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organizations in Turkey since the 1999 Helsinki Summit, this article will show the transformative 
effect of the #Occupygezi movement on the mindsets of secular groups, who were previously Euro-
skeptic. Subsequently, the article will claim that the last frame, the critical-Europeanist frame, has 
recently being challenged by the refugee deal made between the EU and the Turkish state in March 
2016, due to the belief of the critical Europeanist individuals and groups that the EU has prioritized 
security concerns over the European values. Methodologically, the article is based on the literature 
survey, qualitative field research on the civil society actors, and discourse analysis of the civil 
society actors (associations, trade unions, and the media) in relation to their changing perception of 
the EU. 
The competing frames in the Turkish discourse on Europe 
In this section, different types of Euro-framings generated by Turkish CSOs will be delineated to 
see to what extent Turkish civil society has internalized and/or externalized the wider 
Europeanization trend. In this regard, three different forms of framing will be introduced: a) Euro-
enthusiastic attitudes; b) Euro-skeptic attitudes; and c) critical Europeanist attitudes. However, the 
focus will be on the last frame as the first two frames have so far been extensively discussed in the 
European studies literature and elsewhere. Kaya and Marchetti already stated that there are three 
main frames which could be distinguished in the current debate among European civil society 
actors.2 The predominant frame, at least before the eruption of the 2008 financial crisis, for the 
political action of many civil society actors, is the Euro-enthusiastic attitude. Despite entailing 
different degrees of support for the European project, the Euro-enthusiastic frame proposes a 
positive assessment of the European development so far, and more importantly detects the actual 
origin of the current problems of the EU institutions. Euro-skepticism as a frame suggests a reading 
of the regional integration process as a set of detrimental dynamics that threatens the communitarian 
bases necessary for the sustainability of the local and national political projects. This frame has 
recently become very popular among the private European citizens who suffer from the devastating 
effects of the neo-liberal governance leading to the isolation and alienation of the rural, less 
educated, unemployed and elderly individuals. Finally, a third growing frame is represented by the 
critical Europeanists. According to this, a social Europe should be strengthened in opposition to the 
Europe of markets. A more political Europe, it holds, is needed to counter the apolitical and elite-
driven Europe that we have known so far. The process of Europeanization is seen from this angle as 
developing also by contestation: a contested public debate is the surest path towards supranational 
legitimacy. 
The European Union perspective offered in Helsinki has radically transformed the political 
establishment in Turkey, opening up new prospects for various ethnic, religious, social and political 
groups in Turkish civil society. Kurds, Alevis, Islamists, Circassians, Armenians and a number of 
religious and ethnic groups in Turkey have become true advocates of the European Union in a way 
that has affirmed the pillars of the political union as a project for peace and integration. The 
normative and transformative power of the EU provided immediately after 1999 a great incentive 
and motivation for numerous groups in Turkey to reinforce their willingness to coexist in harmony. 
What lies beneath this willingness no longer seems to be the glorious retrospective past, which has 
lately been perceived to be full of ideological and political disagreements among various groups, 
but rather the prospective future, in which ethnic, religious and cultural differences are expected to 
be embraced in a democratic way.3 The EU has thus appeared to be the major catalyst in 
accelerating the process of democratization in Turkey, or in other words, a lighthouse illuminating 
Turkey’s road to modernization and liberalization.4 However, this kind of Euro-enthusiastic frame 
was later challenged by different groups on various grounds. 
In the Turkish debate on Europe, there have been moments and dimensions critical of the 
EU. From 17th December 2004 to 3rd October 2005, when EU state and national government leaders 
decided to start negotiations with Turkey, tensions began to rise between nationalist, patriotic, 
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statist, pro-status-quo groups on the one hand and pro-EU groups on the other hand. This was the 
time when the virtuous cycle of the period between 1999 and 2005 was replaced by the vicious 
cycle starting in late 2005. A new nationalist and religious wave embraced the country, especially 
among middle class and upper middle class groups. The actual start of the accession negotiations in 
2005 was a turning point towards Euro-skepticism. This was also observed in several previous cases 
during the accession negotiations of the 2004/2007 entrants. The political elite and the government 
had come to realize that accession negotiations are not in fact “negotiations” but rather a unilateral 
imposition from the EU.5 Furthermore, this reality of actual accession negotiations is often abused 
by politicians to unfoundedly blame many governmental actions on the EU. Whether the “blaming 
of Brussels” is honest or not, the overall impact on public support has almost surely been negative. 
The electoral cycle of presidential and general elections witnessed militarist, nationalist and Euro-
skeptic aspirations coupled with rising violence and terror in the country prior to the elections in 
2007. The fight between the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the other statist political 
parties, backed by the military establishment, became crystallized during the presidential election in 
May 2007. The AKP gained an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in the 2002, 2007, 2011 
and 2015 general elections, as well as in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 local elections. It became the first 
party since 1987 to win the majority of seats in the Turkish parliament.6 
Euro-skepticism, nationalism and parochialism in Turkey were triggered by the sentiments 
of disapproval towards the American occupation of Iraq, the limitations on national sovereignty 
posed by the EU integration, the high tide of the 90th anniversary in 2005 of the Armenian 
“deportation”/“genocide” among the Armenian diaspora, the “risk of recognition” of southern 
Cyprus by Turkey for the sake of EU integration, anti-Turkey public opinion in the EU countries 
framed by conservative powers (e.g. France and Austria), and Israel’s attacks on Lebanon in 2006. 
Against such a background, the state elite has also become very skeptical of the Europeanization 
process. The best way to explain the sources of such skepticism among the state elite is to refer to 
the “Sèvres Syndrome,” which is based on a fear deriving from the post-World War I era and 
characterized by popular belief regarding the risk of the break-up of the Turkish state.7 AKP 
immediately stepped back after 2005 from its pro-European position, as it was perceived by the 
party that the EU no longer paid off. Actually, it was not the nationalist climax in the country that 
turned the AKP into a Euro-skeptic party, but rather the decision of the European Court of Human 
Rights vis-à-vis the headscarf case of Leyla Şahin v. Turkey, which challenged a Turkish law 
banning wearing the Islamic headscarf at universities and other educational and state institutions.8 
The public frustration about the European stance on Turkey’s membership and the 
associated Euro-skepticism reached high levels. The transatlantic trend survey of the German 
Marshall Fund undertaken in 2010 reveals this negative mood within the civil society.9 When asked 
for the relation between Turkey and the European Union, 35 percent of the Turkish public indicated 
a negative relation, 28 percent a mixed relation and only 22 percent a positive relation. When asked 
for the countries that Turkey should act in closest cooperation with on international affairs, the EU 
scored a substantial decline from 22 percent to 13 percent, and countries from the Middle East 
increased significantly between 2009 and 2010 from 10 to 20 percent. In the meantime, 34 percent 
argued that Turkey should act alone. Additionally, when asked for a general assessment of Turkish 
membership in the EU, while 73 percent of the Turkish public considered an EU membership a 
good thing in 2004, the rate had declined to 38 percent by 2010. Furthermore, while in 2004 only 9 
percent considered EU membership a bad thing, 31 percent viewed it as undesirable in 2010. 
However, after the Occupygezi movement, which will be discussed in the following section, the 
support for European Union membership went up to 43 percent.10 The #Occupygezi movement 
became the trigger for the emergence of a form of critical Europeanism. There appeared a sharp 
increase in public support for Turkey’s membership to the EU following the Gezi movement, 
climbing up to 61 percent in 2015, and 75 percent in May 2016. The main driving force behind this 
growing public support for the EU was the increasing longing of the majority of the Turkish society 
Page 3 of 17
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/ftur
Turkish Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
 4
for democracy, accountability, transparency, freedom of speech and the rule of law, the values of 
which the EU was strongly believed to have.  
Emerging Critical Europeanism in the Aftermath of #Occupygezi 
Occupygezi is one of those new global social movements which has similar characteristics to its 
predecessors such as Tahrir Square, Occupy Wall Street and the European Indignado movement. 
The Gezi movement has become very instrumental in the sense that Turkish civil society actors 
have reframed European integration. Following the Gezi movement, Turkish civil society has 
become more pro-European, and the European Union circles have also changed their perceptions 
about the Turkish society. In the meantime, the main oppositional party, the Republican People’s 
Party (CHP), has also become more pro-European after the Gezi movement. The leader of the CHP, 
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, even wrote a letter to the German Chancellor Angela Merkel urging her not to 
block Turkey’s EU accession talks due to the brutality of the police forces against the protestors 
during the #Occupygezi movement.11 It was very remarkable that the Gezi movement actually made 
the CHP as well as some previously Euro-skeptic civil society organizations like the labor unions 
(e.g. the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions, or DISK) and certain oppositional newspapers, 
such as Sözcü and Cumhuriyet, become pro-European, or critical Europeanists.12 In a way, they 
have generated a more critical stance on Turkey-EU relations as they have become more in favor of 
a socially, democratically and politically prosperous European Union. 
The Occupygezi movement also bears various characteristics similar to its predecessors such 
as Tahrir, Occupy Wall Street, and Indignado protests. Alain Badiou argued that Tahrir Square and 
all the activities which took place there, such as fighting, barricading, camping, debating, cooking, 
bartering and caring for the wounded, constituted the ‘communism of movement’ in a way that 
posited an alternative to the neoliberal democratic and authoritarian state.13 Similarly, Slavoj Žižek 
claimed that only these totally new political and social movements without hegemonic 
organizations and charismatic leaderships could create what he called the ‘magic of Tahrir.’14  
Hardt and Negri also joined them in arguing that the Arab Spring, Europe’s indignado protests and 
Occupy Wall Street expressed the longing of the multitude for a ‘real democracy’ against corporate 
capitalism.15 The Occupygezi movement is similar to the others in the sense that it has brought 
about a prefigurative form of politics, as it symbolized the rejection in all walks of life of Erdogan’s 
vanguardism and engineering of the life-worlds of Turkish citizens: raising ‘religious and 
conservative youth’, his call to mothers to have at least three children, his direct intervention in the 
content of Turkish soap operas, his direct order banning alcohol on university campuses, his 
intention to build mosques in Taksim Square and on Camlica Hill, his condescending say over the 
lives of individuals and his increasing authoritarian discourse, which is based in Islamic 
references.16 
As Marina Sitrin put it in the context of the Occupy Wall Street protests, the purpose of the 
Gezi movement was “not to determine the path the country should take, but to create the space for a 
conversation in which all can participate and determine together what the future should look like.”17 
Rejecting all kinds of hierarchies and embracing prefigurative politics, citizens of all kinds  
(youngsters, socialists, Muslims, nationalists, Kemalists, Kurds, Alevis, gays/lesbians, ecologists, 
football fans, hackers, artists, activists, academics, anarchists, anti-war activists, women’s groups, 
and others) gathered in Gezi Park in Taksim. Gezi Park has in the past been a site for left-wing 
working-class demonstrations, to create a multiplicity of spaces such as social centers, graffiti walls, 
libraries, collective kitchens, music venues, conference venues, day care corners, book fairs, barter 
tables, utopic streets and squares18 and democratic forums, which provide room for 
experimentation, creativity, innovation and dissent. These civil utopias brought about a form of 
solidarity which is cross-cultural, cross-religion, cross-ethnicity, cross-class and cross-gender. 
Respecting difference was also embedded in these civil utopias, where practicing Muslims 
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respected atheists, atheists respected practicing Muslims, all respected homosexuals,  Kemalists 
respected the Kurdish activists, Kurds respected the Kemalists, Besiktas football fans respected 
Fenerbahce fans and the elderly respected the youngsters. In the spaces of communication created 
by the demonstrators, individual civil society actors coming from different ideological grounds had 
the chance to experience a form of deliberative democracy. In one of her works on the current social 
movements, Donatella Della Porta draws our attention to the critical trust generated by the 
demonstrators in such deliberative settings: 
By relating with each other, recognizing the others and being by them recognized, citizens would have the 
chance to understand the reasons of the others, assessing them against emerging standards of fairness. 
Communication not only allows for the development of better solutions, by allowing for carriers of different 
knowledge and expertise to interact, but it also changes the perception of one’s own preferences, making 
participants less concerned with individual, material interests and more with collective goods. Critical trust 
would devel p from encounter with the other in deliberative settings.19 
The Gezi movement also provided its participants with an experience of direct democracy by which 
the holders of different points of view interact and reciprocally transform each other’s views.20 
As in Tahrir Square and Zucotti Park, the demonstrators of Gezi Park also made a point of 
keeping the park clean throughout the demonstrations to show the capacity of “the people” to 
govern themselves.21 The Occupygezi movement was also meant to be an attempt to reassemble the 
social sphere, which had been polarized in different spheres of life between the so-called secularists 
and the Islamists. It was revealed that most of the demonstrators had not been involved in any 
organized demonstration before.22 Gezi Park provided those youngsters who usually only 
communicate online with a meeting ground where they experienced communicating face to face. 
Against the segregation and isolation of everyday life, Occupy offered participatory structures and 
open communication. It invited passive citizens to experience an active sense of what James 
Hoslton calls ‘insurgent citizenship’ by which they could see what an inclusive and egalitarian 
society might look like.23 The Gezi movement was about creating alternative pathways for political 
organization and communication to prefigure the real democracy and active citizenery to come. The 
movement introduced millions of citizens all around the country to the experience of direct 
democracy. It radicalized an entire generation of previously discouraged and apathetic youth, and it 
built test zones for imagining and living out a post-capitalist utopia organized outside profit, 
competition and the corporate world. 
Henri Lefebvre’s path-breaking notion of “the right to the city” is probably the most 
meaningful theoretical intervention to be used to explain what the Occupygezi movement actually 
refers to. Lefebvre defines the city as “an oeuvre, a work in which all citizens participate.”24 
Lefebvre does not accept the monopoly of the state in constructing the urban space. The city is a 
public space of interaction and exchange, and the right to the city enfranchises dwellers to 
participate in the use and reproduction of urban space. The right to the city is the right to “urban 
life, to renewed centrality, to places of encounter and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, 
enabling the full and complete usage of … moments and places.”25 Similarly, David Harvey defines 
the right to the city as being “far more than a right of individual or group access to the resources 
that the city embodies: it is a right to change and reinvent the city more after our hearts' desire. It is, 
moreover, a collective rather than an individual right, since reinventing the city inevitably depends 
upon the exercise of a collective power over the processes of urbanization. The freedom to make 
and remake ourselves and our cities is one of the most precious yet most neglected of our human 
rights.”26 
What happened in Gezi Park was a revolt of the masses against the everlasting authority of 
the state in shaping the public space as well as the city. The revolt was spontaneously organized by 
youngsters of every kind, who were mobilized through new social media like Twitter and Facebook. 
The choice of Gezi Park, which is located at the very center of the city, was also symbolically 
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important, as it was meant to be the space restored from the hands of the corporate world 
collaborating with the neo-liberal state. Lefebvre finds the use of the city center by the dwellers of 
that city to be very important with regard to the materialization of the right to the city:  
The right to the city, complemented by the right to difference and the right to information, should modify, 
concretize and make more practical the rights of the citizen as an urban dweller (citadin) and user of multiple 
services. It would affirm, on the one hand, the right of users to make known their ideas on the space and time 
of their activities in the urban area; it would also cover the right to the use of the center, a privileged place, 
instead of being dispersed and stuck into ghettos for workers, immigrants, the ‘marginal’ and even for the 
‘privileged.’27 
Hence, the Occupygezi movement has become a civil-political venue in which youngsters of every 
kind have communicated with each other in a deliberative form and become active agents of civil 
society in a way that has proved the merits of the ongoing Europeanization processes. One should 
also not forget about the symbolic importance of Taksim Square, in the center of the city next to 
Gezi Park, which is very meaningful to secular segments of Turkish civil society. The historical 
Republican Monument (Cumhuriyet Aniti) symbolizing the Independence War and the foundation 
of the Turkish Republic, the Atatürk Cultural Center (Atatürk Kültür Merkezi) symbolizing 
Kemalist modernity, modern arts and music, and Taksim Square symbolizing the history of the 
working-class movements and May Day celebrations are all very important symbols of modernity, 
Westernization, secularization and Europeanization, terms which are likely to be used 
interchangeably by Turkish citizens.28 
The Actors in the Turkish Public Debate on Europe 
Europe and Europeanization are perceived very differently by various actors depending on the ways 
in which these two entities have been operationalized by the actors in question. Europe has been an 
important anchor for the democratization process of Turkey in the last two decades. Particularly in 
the aftermath of the Helsinki Summit of 1999, EU harmonization efforts to align Turkey’s policies 
with those of Europe occupied the political agenda and led to various constitutional amendment 
packages.29 However, while 1999-2005 marks the rapid reformation of the Turkish legal 
framework, 2005 marks the loss of momentum for said reformation process along the lines of the 
Copenhagen criteria. The EU anchor, which was considered to be at its strongest in the 1999-2005 
period, hence its being considered the “virtuous cycle,” yielded to the “vicious cycle,” where the 
EU anchor weakened and the reformation process almost came to a halt. There are several different 
social and political actors shaping the Europeanization process of Turkey: civil society 
organizations, trade unions and the media. This section will elaborate on the perspectives of these 
actors on the EU before and after the Occupygezi movement. In doing so, the work shall mainly 
scrutinize the mainstream actors without touching upon the minor actors due to the space limitations 
of the work. 
Civil Society Organizations 
Regarding the nature of civil organizations in Turkey, an important argument was made by Keyman 
and Đçduygu that the direction of Turkish modernization since the 1980s and the increasing 
participation of civil society actors in the policy-making process is a result of four processes. They 
are as follows: (1) the changing meaning of modernity, or in other words the emergence of 
alternative modernities, which refers to, first, the emergence of the critique of the status of secular-
rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey, and second, the increasing 
strength of Islamic discourse both as a ‘political actor’ and as a ‘symbolic foundation’ for identity 
formation; (2) the legitimacy crisis of the strong state tradition, which occurred as a result of the 
shift towards civil society and culture as new reference points in the language and terms of politics; 
(3) the process of European integration, referring to the assertion that reforms also indicate that the 
sources of democratization in Turkey are no longer only national but also global, and therefore that 
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 7
the EU plays an important role in the changing nature of state–society relations in Turkey, and 
functions as a powerful actor generating a transformative power in Turkish politics; and (4) the 
process of globalization in which Turkish politics functions as a significant external variable for 
understanding the current state of the political process in Turkey.30 
Although Turkish civil society organizations have been deemed weak policy actors due to 
the assertion that respect for authority is stressed over citizen empowerment and participation while 
democracy has been shallow, imposed from above by Westernizing elites on a largely peasant, 
passive society, in the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s civil society organizations began to 
proliferate.31 While it is agreed upon that this proliferation was highly contingent on economic 
liberalization, Keyman and Đçduygu argue that this increase can also be associated with the political 
parties, such that: 
the center-Right and center-Left political parties have continuously been declining in terms of their popular 
support and their ability to produce effective and convincing policies, while at the same time both the 
resurgence of identity politics and civil society have become strong and influential actors of social and political 
change.32 
Ersin Kalaycıoğlu agrees that although the visible statist orientation (étatism) in Turkey stresses 
community over the individual, uniformity over diversity and an understanding of law that 
privileges collective reason, the reasons for this phenomenon are founded on the critical relations 
between the center and the periphery.33 
Perhaps as a part of this dynamic, namely the association of the center with the state, 
Kalaycıoğlu argues that, among others, TÜSĐAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve Đşadamları Derneği, Turkish 
Industrialists and Businessmen Association), Türk-Đş (Türkiye Đşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu,  
Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), TOBB (Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birliği, The Union of 
Chamber and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey), MÜSĐAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve Đşadamları 
Derneği, Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association), and TUSKON ((Turkey’s 
Businessmen and Industrialists Confederation) often benefit from their cooperation with the state, 
rather than cooperation with other voluntary associations to pressure the state. As a rule, voluntary 
associations do not seem to consider the state as an adversary, but rather as an ally to be mobilized 
against their competitors.34 The corporatist path-dependent stance of the aforementioned 
associations has also recently continued upon the authoritarian rule of President Erdoğan. On the 
other hand, protest movements and advocacy associations which confront the Turkish state and 
advocate change in the political system are not received well by the state, though they receive 
media attention.35 In contrast, Atan argues that certain civil society organizations do not necessarily 
cooperate with the state and that  
…while Turkish civil society is traditionally weak vis-à-vis the state, Turkish PBOs [Peak Business 
Organizations] appear as significant actors to challenge the government’s policy agenda. Familiarisation with 
the EU-level governance system had provided them with additional resources to act upon the domestic agenda-
setting process.36 
To that effect, it should be noted that TÜSĐAD, an association including big business, has been one 
of the most discussed civil society actors in literature. In terms of EU membership, Atan argues that 
TÜSĐAD played an important role in the aftermath of 1997 by strengthening their ties with their 
European counterparts through the EU institutions and governments in order to encourage Turkey’s 
EU membership.37 Additionally, TÜSĐAD prompted domestic policy changes in Turkey in favor of 
harmonization with the EU member states through the 1997 report entitled “The Perspectives on 
Democratization in Turkey.”38  These reports have been discussed and cited by several scholars as a 
reflection of the growing civil society participation in the domestic policy-making process. 
MÜSĐAD (Müstakil Sanayici ve Đşadamları Derneği, Independent Industrialists and 
Businessmen Association) is another business association that mainly consists of AKP supporters. 
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MÜSĐAD appears to be an organization advocating a different model of economic and social 
development using a certain interpretation of Islam to ensure the cohesion of its members and to 
represent their economic interest as an integral component of an ideological mission.39 
Consequently, MÜSĐAD follows a discourse emphasizing the compatibility of EU membership 
with the ‘Islamic and democratic identity’ of the Turkish society,40 a discourse which is quite 
similar to the arguments made by the members of the AKP.  On the other hand, the Europeanization 
process has produced two dynamics: firstly, economic Europeanization as a social learning process 
and political Europeanization as political opportunism, and secondly, an ongoing Euro-skepticism.41 
Furthermore, one could also observe that there is an interesting shift from hard Euro-skepticism 
based on a civilizational divergence argument towards a soft Euro-skepticism expressed in national 
interest and in a new Islamic rhetoric in line with the assumption that Turkey has become a “soft 
power” in its region in the late 2000s. TUSKON (Turkey’s Businessmen and Industrialists 
Confederation), another business association, was founded during the 1990s. The association 
consists of seven federations based on more than two hundred local associations and more than 
55,000 entrepreneurs scattered all around the world. The most distinctive feature of TUSKON is its 
close ties with the Gülen Movement, which was an ally of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan until very 
recently.42 
In addition to business associations, it should be noted that the IKV (Iktisadi Kalkınma 
Vakfi, Economic Development Foundation) was established as an initiative of the Istanbul Chamber 
of Commerce in 1965 to inform the public about the internal affairs of the EU as well as the 
relations between Turkey and the EU. Similarly, TESEV (Türkiye Ekonomik ve Sosyal Etüdler 
Vakfı, Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) is a non-governmental think tank focusing 
on social, political and economic policies in Turkey. Both IKV and TESEV have been very active 
in informing the public and the government on EU-related issues.43 One should also note that there 
have been several other civil society organizations such as environmental groups (WWF, Regional 
Environment Centre), human rights organizations (Helsinki Citizens Assembly, TÜSEV, Anadolu 
Kültür), women’s rights organizations (KADER, KAGIDER), LGBT groups, and international 
foundations (Heinrich Böll Foundation, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Open Society Foundation, 
British Council, etc.) advocating the EU in Turkey.44 
During and after the Gezi movement, the position of the above-mentioned business 
organizations largely differed from each other. TÜSIAD continuously criticized the AKP 
government on the issues of abortion, women’s rights, freedom of press and fundamental rights. 
However, the clientalist and corporatist nature of state and business relations in Turkey put pressure 
on the secular business circles to remain in alliance with the government. Despite the corporatist 
links with the state actors, most of the members of the TÜSIAD took a supportive role for the 
democratic rights of the protesters. Taking a critical Europeanist position in his statement, 
TÜSIAD’s chairman touched upon the disproportionate intervention of police forces against 
protesters that prompted the small protest into a full blown reaction towards the government.45 On 
the other hand, TUSKON was silent during the Gezi process. After the then PM Erdoğan explicitly 
started to accuse the Gülen movement about the Gezi protests, the members of TUSKON took a 
new position. The association started to accuse the government as corrupt and oppressive in line 
with the Gezi protestors.46 
Trade Unions 
In comparison to the literature on civil society organizations and political parties, the literature on 
trade unions with respect to their role in the Europeanization of Turkey during the post-Helsinki 
period is rather limited. Nevertheless, it is possible to characterize the stances of trade unions as 
rather cautious and inconsistent. For instance, on the one hand they argue that the Europeanization 
process would cause unemployment and the disintegration of the country; on the other hand, EU 
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membership is seen as providing an opportunity to move forward and to improve labor rights.47 
However, it is also noted by others that:  
Many of the labor market problems currently experienced in Turkey emerge in a context of rapid structural 
change. Until quite recently, the bulk of employment was in the agricultural sector, whereas today the urban 
labor force in industry and services is much larger than the rural workforce.48 
In reference to her in-depth interviews with members of the labor unions, Zeynep Alemdar argues 
that although the literature expects them to appeal to the EU for better labor standards or workers’ 
rights, Turkish domestic actors’ use of the EU depends heavily on the domestic environment and 
their respective perceptions of the EU.49 In fact, Alemdar’s argument in general is also reflective of 
shifting views towards the EU, but she relies on the premise that the domestic environment, such as 
the military coups, political party alliances and labor regulations, influences the ways in which trade 
unions perceive the EU. Consequently, the unions appeal to the EU when they are not satisfied with 
the domestic politics.  
In order to examine the perceptions of the labor unions on EU membership and the reforms 
it necessitates, scholars tend to look at the cases of Türk-Đş (Türkiye Đşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions), DĐSK (Devrimci Đşçi Sendikaları 
Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Revolutionary Trade Unions), KESK (Confederation of Public 
Laborer's Unions) and Hak-Đş (Hak Đşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu, Confederation of Justice-
Seekers’ Trade Union). These Unions are all members of the European Trade Union Confederation. 
Alemdar describes TÜRK-ĐŞ as a state-centric labor union, showing that Türk-Đş took an openly 
anti-EU stance after 2000 but has softened its position since 2005, as membership negations began. 
TÜRK-ĐŞ’s position vis-à-vis the EU is very well explicated by Yıldırım Koç, who is one of the 
advocates of the syndicate: 
The European Union’s demands for Turkey are in opposition to the Turkish Republic’s unitary state system 
and its independence. Abiding by these demands would tear our country apart and divide it, creating a new 
Yugoslavia. Turkey is not going to solve its problems through the EU. Turkey is not going to be stronger 
because of the EU. Turkey is going to solve its problems despite the EU, and it will be stronger. Turkey’s 
admittance to the EU is dependent on this strength.50 
It is important to note that Koç’s argument is similar to the political parties’ concerns over territorial 
integrity as well as the unity of the Republic. While TÜRK-ĐŞ did not necessarily reflect the 
structure of its counterparts in the EU, DISK, which is considered a supporter of the left wing, 
reformulated itself in the 1990s in line with the European trade unions.51 Consequently, DISK has 
been adamant in pressuring the government and lobbying to harmonize Turkish labor regulations 
with those of the EU.52 
Hak-Đş, on the other hand, presents a different dynamic in the sense that Hak-Đş’ attitude 
towards the EU has been intricately linked with the organization’s liaisons with the government. 
When the government was pursuing the EU, the appeal of the EU was strong, and vice-versa.53 In 
December 1999, Hak-Đş declared its stance towards the EU as follows: 
A major challenge to integration with Europe is Turkey’s Muslim population. Turkey, because of its historical, 
moral, philosophical, religious and national characteristics, is not Western. ‘Westernization’ comes as a 
betrayal and alienation to Turkish culture . . . if membership in the EU is pushed, this would mean a total 
surrender [to Western values]. On the other hand, Turkey’s application for EU membership means a heavy 
legal burden for the Constitution and other laws, and constitutes a threat to the state’s sovereignty and the 
nation’s unity…the fact that the government and the opposition parties are silent about this raises questions.54 
However, as the Islamist political parties modified their perceptions of the EU and the notion of 
Westernization, Hak-Đş also followed the same discourse, in line with the AKP. 
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During and after the Gezi movement, the labor unions generated different perspectives. The 
majority of  the Unions became critical Europeanists. Major trade unions such as DISK and KESK 
mobilized their mass organizations through the declaration of two general strikes during the protests 
in June 2013. Initially, the KESK called for a national 24 hour strike for June 5th. On June 4th, 
DISK, TMMOB (the Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) and TTB (The 
Turkish Medical Association) declared their support for the strike on the 5th of June. This strike 
took place with a significant participation from the public sector. It is estimated that between 
400,000 and 500,000 workers participated in the strike throughout the country.55 Although Hak-Đş 
and large parts of TÜRK-IŞ did not support the uprising, some platforms within TÜRK-IŞ joined 
the strike to declare their support for the protesters against the brutality of state security forces. 
Media 
First and foremost, it should be noted that similarly to the literature on trade unions, the literature on 
the role of the media in the process of modernization and Europeanization of Turkey is very limited. 
Nevertheless, scholars have studied the nature of the Turkish media, which can be used to indicate 
certain trends. During the period between 1982 and 1993, it is possible to observe a proliferation in 
media outlets, which was a result of non-media-related capital in the sector altering the structure of 
the media to resemble industrial enterprises.56 The technological developments during this period 
contributed to the establishment of numerous television and radio channels, both local and national. 
As the intensity of competition increased in tandem with the rise of capitalist ideology, media 
enterprises began to focus more on sales. In correlation with the increased competition, this period 
was marked by, among other things, the rise of monopolies in the sector, which in return created 
support for the government and politicians due to the growing need for “incentives, credits, and 
public announcements.”57 
The Turkish media could be categorized as a part of the Mediterranean model. In this model, 
the journalists “take sides as members of the political and literary elites.” The Mediterranean, or 
Polarized Pluralist Model, is characterized by an elite-oriented press with relatively small 
circulation and a corresponding centrality of electronic media. Freedom of the press and the 
development of commercial media industries generally came late; newspapers have often been 
economically marginal and in need of subsidy. Political parallelism tends to be high; the press is 
marked by a strong focus on political life and external pluralism, and the tradition of commentary-
oriented or advocacy journalism persists more strongly than in other parts of Europe. 
Instrumentalization of the media by the government, by political parties and by industrialists with 
political ties is common. Professionalization of journalism is not strongly developed as in the other 
models. Journalism is not strongly differentiated from political activism and the autonomy of 
journalism is often limited.58 
Turkish journalists have also been swinging between Euro-supportiveness and Euro-
skepticism while framing the EU beyond traditional institutional news coverage, like “Turkey must 
fulfill its EU requirements by…” or “the EU must fulfill its promises…”59 While Arsan depicts the 
problematic nature of journalists situated in Brussels, it is also necessary to examine the nature of 
domestic sources of information. In terms of the domestic television channels, Gencel Bek suggests 
that Turkish media has also gone through a “tabloidization process.” As a part of her research, she 
analyzes the state-owned TRT (Türkiye Radyo ve Televizyon Kurumu, Turkish Radio and 
Television Corporation), and characterizes the quality of the news as follows:   
In general, the reports are quite bland accounts of cabinet meetings. There is no setting of context, 
interpretation, discussion or criticism. TRT just reports that such and such politicians met, in a formulaic way. 
The news gives no other information such as who else talked in the meeting, who said what, what the main aim 
of the meeting was, etc... What TRT does achieve, however, is full coverage of all the national ceremonies, 
reminding the public of national history from the perspective of the official memory. One could call TRT news 
the ‘news of the nation-state.’60 
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The above-mentioned argument is partly a result of the mentality followed by RTÜK (Radyo 
Televizyon Üst Kurulu, Radio and Television Supreme Council), which is a public legal entity that 
monitors television channels. On that issue Gencel Bek criticizes the operations of the RTÜK for 
being in favor of the state. She argues: 
The peculiar characteristics of broadcasting regulation also have an effect on content: the RTÜK controls 
content to a far greater extent than media structure, concentration, increasing market mechanisms, etc. Content 
control and subsequent penalties are mainly directed towards the channels ‘which are against the state.’ 
Protecting the state takes precedence over the citizen’s right to information.61 
Even though Arsan and Gencel Bek examine different aspects of the Turkish media, it is possible to 
infer a common theme, which is that the news media––both journalists in Brussels and the TRT––
filter the news before it reaches the public. In that sense, the lack of professional and extensive 
media coverage from Brussels and the domination of the public service channel by nationalist 
events indicate that the citizen’s right to information about the EU and the process of 
Europeanization has been overshadowed by political and social interests. Moreover, media 
coverage depends highly on the relations of media ventures with the government in particular, and 
with the political parties in general.  
The media has been shifting between Euro-scepticism and pro-Europeanness. The EU has 
always been a practical source of legitimacy for the media in Turkey. Cumhuriyet and Sözcü, for 
instance, are two Kemalist daily newspapers with Euro-skeptic coverage prior to the Gezi 
movement. Both changed their discourses on the EU in parallel with that of the Republican People’s 
Party. Both papers have become more pro-European during and after the Gezi movement.62 Another 
very interesting newspaper, which is likely to instrumentalize European integration for its own use, 
is Daily Zaman. It is publicly known that Zaman belongs to the Gülen community, which was an 
ally of the ruling party AKP. Recenty, the AKP rule cut off its alliance with the Gülen community. 
The divide between the party and the community became visible when Prime Minister Erdoğan 
publicly declared in November 2013 that they would ban preparatory schools (dershane in Turkish), 
specialized education centers that help prepare students for high school and university entrance 
examinations. The Gülen community has hundreds of prep schools all around the country, where 
teachers affiliated with the mission of the community indoctrinate students with a kind of moderate 
Islam while preparing them for university and high school exams. Interestingly, Daily Zaman used 
Chapter 22 (Regional Policy) to spread its message out to its readers, saying that “the government 
plan to close down Turkey's prep schools will widen the educational gap created by social and 
economic inequality and regional disparities in Turkey, and it may endanger the implementation of 
the recently opened Chapter 22 in Turkey's European Union accession process.”63 
Conclusion: The Future of the EU Debate in Turkey 
The analysis developed in this paper points to the relevance of the discursive interaction between 
the European internal debate and the Turkish debate on the EU.64 The article has shown that similar 
frames have been developed in the civil society debate in the EU and in Turkey. The fact that these 
are (partly) overlapping is evidence in itself of the ideational exchange between the two sides. Such 
exchange is both subterranean, channeled through a myriad of people-to-people micro-practices that 
create a de facto link between EU civil society and its Turkish counterpart, and explicit and public 
as reported in the media, in the conventional political debates or in the fora of elites. 
In this regard, a particularly significant case study has been provided by the Occupygezi 
movement and its role in transforming part of the Turkish public debate on Europe. The harsh 
responses of the EU to the brutal acts of the Turkish state have contributed, perhaps unintentionally, 
to a radical turn in the mindsets of the secular groups, who were previously Euro-skeptic. After the 
events, these groups have become more pro-European than the supporters of the AKP rule. In other 
words, some of the Turkish civil society actors and private individuals started to critically embrace 
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the European values by underlining their critical Europeanism. This kind of transformation was 
explained in the article through the ideological and political divides becoming sharper in the 
business associations, labor unions and the media. This confirms once again that the transformation 
of Turkish civil society is deeply intermingled with the European integration process. Sometimes it 
follows a linear trajectory, other times it may follow unexpected paths. 
It is evident that the continuation of the democratization process in Turkey and the 
development of a civil society, both in Turkey itself and in its relation with the European 
counterparts, depend upon the path the EU is likely to take in the foreseeable future. One could also 
easily argue that Turkey’s EU bid strongly shapes the internal discussions within the EU concerning 
the identity of the Union. It is comprehensible that the Turkish democratization process can be 
expected to persist alongside a liberal, political and post-civilizational project of Europe that would 
be ready to welcome Turkey, whereas a culturally and religiously defined Europe would possibly 
abstain from welcoming Turkey and would thus certainly interrupt the democratization process. 
Turkey’s democracy is strongly linked to the ways in which the EU is being constructed and 
reconstructed. There are at least two definitions of Europe and the European Union. The first 
defines Europeanness as a static, retrospective, holistic, essentialist and culturally prescribed entity. 
The latter emphasizes the understanding of ‘Europe’ as a fluid, ongoing, dynamic, prospective, 
syncretic and nonessentialist process of becoming. While the first definition highlights a cultural 
project, the latter definition welcomes a political project embracing cultural and religious 
differences, including Islam. In the article, it was argued that the Occupygezi movement triggered 
the existence of a group of critical Europeanists in different sectors such as business associations, 
labour unions and the media, who begun to underline the importance of European values as well as 
a social Europe in opposition to the Europe of markets. What is embraced by the critical 
Europeanists is a more political Europe that is needed to counter the apolitical and elite-driven 
Europe that we have known so far. Several years passed after the Gezi movement, but still the 
legacy of the movement continues in different ways. The latest manifestation of this legacy was 
revealed through the speeches of the President Erdoğan and Kemal Kiliçdaroğlu, the leader of the 
oppositional political party, CHP, in the aftermath of the failed military coup which took place on 
15 July 2016. In the immediate aftermath of the failed coup the President explicitly expressed his 
anger against his opponents including the Gezi protesters65 while Kilicdaroglu praised the Gezi 
spirit in his speech delivered on 24 July 2016 in during a very crowded public rally organized in 
Taksim square where the gezi movement took place three years ago.66  
Public support for the EU prior to the @Occupygezi movement dropped down to 34 percent 
primarily due to the Euro-skeptic political discourse of the Turkish government as well as due to the 
growing impact of the global financial crisis on the EU countries, especially on the next door 
neighbor Greece. However, there appeared a sharp increase in the public support for Turkey’s 
membership to the EU following the Gezi movement reaching up to 61 percent in 2015. The main 
driving force behind this support was the increasing longing of the majority of the Turkish society 
for democracy, accountability, transparency, freedom of speech, and the rule of law, the values of 
which the EU was strongly believed to have. Recently, the public support for the EU has become 
even higher, reaching 75 percent due to the probability of the EU liberalizing the visa-regime vis-à-
vis Turkey.67 The right to travel without any visa restrictions has always been the main source of 
inspiration for the Turkish public to generate a stronger European identity. However, one needs to 
scrutinize further to understand the motivations of the Turkish citizens in becoming strongly pro-
European. The data gathered by the IKV in May 2016 show that the AKP electorate has also 
become pro-European during the intensification of the debates on visa liberalization, while the 
critical Europeanists and pro-Europeanists seem to be less inspired by these talks since many of 
them were reportedly disturbed by the content of the refugee deal signed between Turkey and the 
EU in March 2016. Many critical Europeanists have blamed the EU leaders as well as the EU 
Commission for not having shown any reaction to President Erdoğan’s authoritarian moves towards 
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the freedom of speech, academics and journalists as well as several other oppositional voices in the 
country criticizing his political maneuvers to control power. 
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